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SENTENCING UNDER THE MODEL PENAL CODE
PAUL W. TAPPAN*
I
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the forms of prison sentencing and
their relationship to parole, with special reference to provisions in the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute. Underlying the tentative Code drafts, there
are, of course, certain conceptions concerning what are appropriate objectives of the
penal law. Put summarily, the provisions relating to sentencing and treatment are
predicated on the assumption that the law should endeavor to protect society as
fully as may reasonably be possible, both by measures of general and individual pre.
vention and by the rehabilitation of offenders. It is further conceived that penal
and correctional provisions should be designed to safeguard offenders against
excessive and arbitrary penalties.
Patently, however, the form and duration of treatment required by different
offenders vary considerably with such factors as the age, personality, offense, and
prior social and criminal history of the individual and with the sociocultural con-
text. The significance of such influences must be taken into account, both in the
provisions of law and in their implementation. It appears, therefore, that a model
code should be so formulated as to harmonize somewhat disparate treatment ob-
jectives.' It should be designed also to facilitate an effective performance by judges
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1 MODL PENA. CODE § 1.02(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) sets out "the general purposes of the
provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of offenders" as follows:
"(a) To prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) to promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders;
(c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment;
(d) to give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on conviction of an
offense;
(e) to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment;
(f) to define, coordinate and harmonize the powers, duties, and functions of the courts and of
administrative officers and agencies responsible for dealing with offenders;
(g) to advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and knowledge in the sentencing and
treatment of offenders;
(h) to integrate responsibility for the administration of the correctional system in a State Department
of Correction [or other single department or agency]."
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and correctional authorities in adapting legal norms to individual offenders so as
to achieve these goals.
In attempting to develop provisions well-designed to accomplish such objectives
as these, serious difficulties inhere-in particular, the intrinsic limitations of the
correctional tools at hand, the persisting inadequacy of our knowledge about the
efficacy of the methods that are employed, and the conflict among reputable authori-
ties on quite fundamental issues of means and ends. To achieve an effective balance
of methods and goals has been a major objective of the Code Reporters during the
past six years-an objective that, with the help of legal and correctional authorities,
they will continue to seek to realize during the remaining years of the project.
Let us look briefly at the development and forms of sentencing that are employed
in the United States and then at some of the central provisions of the Code.
II
Serious semantic difficulties are involved in the analysis of the problems of
sentencing and parole. The nomenclature generally employed is quite misleading.
There can be little doubt, indeed, that much of the confusion that may be found in
the critical literature in this field stems, on the one hand, from the loose and con-
flicting terminology of sentencing and, on the other, from the peculiarities in the
historical evolution of sentencing and parole practices.
The definite-sentence system was, in origin, a product of classical criminology,
with its emphasis upon equality and certainty of punishment expressed in the
establishment of prescribed sanctions for every crime according to its seriousness.
Its primary aim was deterrence, and only incidentally did it purport to remedy the
arbitrary abuses that had characterized the preclassical practice of wide judicial dis-
cretion. The classical policy of prescribed terms was adopted in the French Penal
Code of i79i and soon spread in both civil and common-law countries. Only
twenty years later, however, the excessive rigidity of the system had been recog-
nized, and it was modified in the Code of i8io and by subsequent laws of 1824
and 1832, which permitted a measure of judicial discrimination in sentencing in
accordance with mitigating or aggravating circumstances. During the same period,
there also developed the marking and grading system-first in British penology and
then in the reformatories in the United States-and the practice of allowing "good
time" reduction of imprisonment-first in New York in 1817-both of which re-
duced the definiteness of correctional sentences.
A more significant change in the definite-sentence system, however, came with
the development in the late nineteenth century of conditional-release measures,
innovations that made obsolete the original and ostensible meaning of the definite
sentence. Parole and the indeterminate sentence, while two quite distinct penological
concepts, have become very closely interdependent in the course of their develop-
ment. Parole was initially applied to young offenders under indeterminate sentences
at the Elmira (New York) Reformatory in 1869, but it was extended to adult
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prisoners in Ohio in 1884 and thence spread rapidly to other jurisdictions, where it
was employed in connection with definite as well as indeterminate sentences. In-
deed, in i9oo, although only eleven jurisdictions had enacted indeterminate-sentence
laws, twenty had adopted parole.2 In the definite-sentence states, laws were drafted
rendering prisoners eligible for conditional release upon the expiration of some
part of their sentences. The effect of this was, in fact, to create another form of
indeterminate sentence in which the maximum term was fixed at the time of com-
mitment and the minimum term was some fraction thereof or a prescribed number
of years dictated by a general provision of the penal law relating to parole eligibility.
This differed from the indeterminate sentence primarily in that under the latter,
both the minimum and the maximum terms are expressed in the sentence of the
court within a range prescribed by law.
Today, there are eleven jurisdictions that employ this much modified, but still-
called, definite sentence almost exclusively and eight others that use it prepond-
erantiy. Good-time laws, too, have been enacted in all states save California. Ac-
cordingly, except for the unusual case where a crime may require the imposition of
a mandatory term without privilege of parole, the offender convicted of a felony and
sentenced to a "fixed term" in fact faces an indefinite period of imprisonment, with
a possibility of parole or early release on good time within that term.
The indeterminate sentence originally meant a term without a maximum or min-
imum length. It was in this sense that Z. R. Brockway and other penological idealists
of the late nineteenth century used the term in their agitation for a sentencing
system aimed at protecting society by controlling the offender for a period of un-
limited duration3 The view that offenders should be imprisoned until reformed
appears to have derived largely from Italian positivistic criminology of this period.
The influences of legalism and realism were powerful enough, however, to prevent
the enactment of this form of indeterminate sentencing. Concern for personal
liberty, skepticism concerning administrative decisions about prisoner reformation
and readiness for release, insistence upon the preservation of some measure of
deterrent emphasis, and other such factors, undoubtedly, led, instead, to a system-
indeed, a complex of systems-in which maximum terms were generally employed.
At the Elmira Reformatory, where the relatively indeterminate-sentence system
was first established, this involved a term not greater than that prescribed by the
penal law for the crime involved; but release could occur whenever the offender was
believed to have reformed. As sentences of indefinite duration came to be imposed
upon adult felons, minimum as well as maximum terms were generally employed.
And eventually, the indeterminate concept was translated into a variety of sentencing
and release practices that bore no real resemblance to the principle of complete
indeterminacy that had earlier been espoused by the criminological positivists. In
fact, as will be seen, the indeterminate sentence has come to mean quite different
24 U.S. DEPI"r oF JusTCE, A-rTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 20 (1939).
'Z. R. BRoc IwAy, FIFTY YEARS OF PRIsON SERVICE 126 (1912).
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things in the several jurisdictions. One of the anomalies of sentencing law and
practice is, however, that in many jurisdictions where this system has been adopted,
the sentencing judge may, if he chooses, set the minimum and maximum terms so
closely together that the result approximates that of the old, now obsolete, definite-
sentence systems; and, thus, if he so desires, he may make parole impossible.
Today, the partially-indeterminate sentence-in which the minimum and maxi-
mum terms are fixed by some agency within statutory limits-is employed in commit-
ting felons in a majority of jurisdictions. It is used exclusively-except for life-im-
prisonment terms and death sentences-in eight jurisdictions and preponderantly in
an additional twenty-two. In i95o, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia
provided for the imposition of indeterminate sentences in some cases, and such sen-
tences were actually employed in 57.6 per cent of prison terms in I95o,4 as compared to
46.6 per cent in 1940
Analysis of the relevant statutes in the penal codes of the several jurisdictions
points up the wide diversity of law and practice in the sentencing process. Table
one indicates the major locus of sentencing power both in those jurisdictions that
employ preponderantly the indeterminate sentence and in those in which the so-called
definite sentence is mainly used. But the table reveals the variations only partially,
for in some jurisdictions, definite, partially-indeterminate, and fully-indeterminate
sentences are all used! In effect, however, these sentences tend to devolve into
some indeterminate form whose upper and lower limits are set by law, court, or
administrative agency. It will be noted that in a few jurisdictions, the statutes them-
selves indicate precisely the sentence which the court must impose; elsewhere, statu-
tory limits are prescribed, but the specific terms of the sentence are determined by
the judge, the jury, or an administrative agency in accordance with the legal pro-
visions of the particular jurisdiction. In the definite-sentence jurisdictions, the
minimum term is ordinarily determined by a general provision of the penal law,
as has been remarked; in a few jurisdictions, however, no minimum term at all is
prescribed, and the parole board is, therefore, empowered to release at any time.
The introduction of the indeterminate sentence and parole has had important
consequences in practices of prison-sentencing and retention. One has been the
considerable diversification of sentencing methods, apparent from table one. Another
has been the establishment in certain jurisdictions of what seem unnecessarily
high permissible terms, even if they are designed to constrain repetitive offenders.
This may, perhaps, be interpreted as the persistence of an idealistic and largely
anachronistic theory of unlimited control that was implicit in the completely
indeterminate sentence principle. More likely, however, a single massive prison
'U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, 1950,.
table 27 (1954).
5U.S. BUREAUr OF THE CENSUS, DEF'T OF COMIERCE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS ANI
REFORMATORIES, 1940, table i8 (1943).
'This table and an analysis of its implications appears in MODEL PENAL CODz 26 et seq. (Discussion
Draft No. 2, 1953).
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TABLE I
AuTHosiTy FOR SETTING SENTENCES
Indeterminate Sentences
Fixed by Statute:
Idaho,a Indiana, Iowa a Kansas, Michiganb Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio,
Fixed by Judge within Statutory Limits:
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota," New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,a Pennsyl-
vania, Utah,e Vermont, Wisconsind Wyoming, District of Columbia
Fixed by Jury within Statutory Limits:
Georgia
Fixed by Administrative Agency within Statutory Limits:




Fixed by Judge within Statutory Limits:
Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, e Federal
Fixed by Jury within Statutory Limits:
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri e Oklahoma,e Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
Fixed by Administrative Agency within Statutory Limits:
South Dakota
No minimum term is fixed in these jurisdictions. In addition, there are nine others (Connecticut,
Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) where no minimum
term is fixed for reformatory prisoners.
bIn this jurisdiction, the minimum term is set by the court, while the maximum term is fixed by law.
'The parole board is empowered to release at any time in these jurisdictions.
a In this jurisdiction, the minimum term is fixed by law, while the maximum term is set by the court.
sentence is rather designed to incorporate not only a period of imprisonment-
perhaps a long one-but also a period of parole supervision and, if necessary, a
further reimprisonment for violation, perhaps with reparole. Such provisions for
very high sentences have been especially characteristic in a few jurisdictions where
the volume of crime is large. Furthermore, offenders can be retained in prison until
the end of their maximum terms under these high sentences, since it has been held
that parole is a matter of grace and may be withheld or revoked at the unfettered
discretion of the authorities. Thus, individuals in these jurisdictions are subject to
the possibility, and often to the fact, of greatly extended imprisonment.1 Elsewhere,
much lower sentences are imposed for similar crimes.8 Indeterminate sentences-
7 See MODEL PENAL CODE 114-24 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).8 See U.S. BumEAu OF PRIsONs, DEP'T OF JUsTICE, PRISONERS RELEASED FROM STATE AND FEDERAL
INsTtrTMONS, 595i, table 5 (1955), in which the differences in duration of imprisonment for each of the
major felonies is given according to jurisdiction. The median duration of imprisonment for robbery
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and, for that matter, definite sentences, too-accordingly, can be quite abusive in
effect.
Another significant consequence of the introduction of parole has been a re-
distribution of powers relating to sentence and correction. Duration of imprisonment
is determined not by statute or court alone, but, to a great and-as the institution
of parole has evolved-an increasing extent, by the paroling authority. Within
the range of the court's sentence, administrative discretion has become controlling-
patently, a large power where the range of sentences is wide. This has been
justified on the ground that the determination of the time when the offender is
ready for release can better be made on the basis of his response to treatment and
his plans for freedom than it could at the time of sentencing. The validity of this
position is incontrovertible. What has not so commonly been recognized, perhaps,
is the fact that where sentence lengths are great and parole board discretion is
unlimited, the result may be unreasonably protracted imprisonment. Effective
sentencing and parole policy, therefore, requires a nicely-balanced distribution of
authority between the legislature, the courts, and the paroling agency, in which terms
are high enough, but not excessive, and the paroling authority is soundly guided in
the discharge of its function.
Contemporary appraisals of sentencing and correction practices reveal that the
current methods of distributing power are something less than completely felicitous.
Two general criticisms are common, the most frequent, perhaps, being that disparity
of sentences exists not only from one jurisdiction to another, but within any juris-
diction from one offender to another similar offender. While the virtues of in-
dividualization of treatment are generally acknowledged, there is a strong suspicion
that the prevailing variations are quite arbitrary, reflecting differences between stat-
utes, individual judges, and parole commissioners more largely than those between
the offenders with whom they deal. Criticism is also directed against the excessive
length and differences in duration of imprisonment.
As has been suggested above, the problems involved in sentencing and release
practices are too subtle relative to the present state of criminological knowledge and
opinion to permit arrival at firm and simple solutions. Even the basic objectives of
correction raise dispute among reputable authorities: What ends should be sought
through the sentencing and treatment of different types of offenders? To what
extent is it feasible to attain them by the measures that are available? Relative to
the personality of the offender, the seriousness of his crime and his threat to the
community, and society's need for deterrence, how should he be sentenced and how
long incarcerated?
The contrariety of expert opinion about sentencing procedures and their effects is
well illustrated by the views lately expressed by the National Probation and Parole
ranged from ten months in Maine to seventy-five months in Indiana. For aggravated assault, the range
was from eight months in Colorado to forty-five months in Illinois. For all offenses, the lowest median
was nine months in Vermont; the highest, thirty-five months in Illinois.
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Association, an organization that has taken considerable interest in these matters.
The 1955 draft of the Association's Standard Probation and Parole Act provided
that maximum terms of prison sentences should be fixed by law rather than by
the courts and that the court should have the discretionary power to impose either
a minimum term up to one-third of the statutory maximum term or no minimum
term at all In a statement endorsed by the Association's Advisory Council of
Judges in 1956 opposing the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute, however, this group took the view, quite opposed to the
Standard Act, that the judge should be empowered to fix the maximum term and
that there should be no minimum term.' ° This position was rationalized on the
ground that where maximum terms are prescribed by law, they tend to be too high
and that the length of imprisonment is directly related to the length of maximum
terms. Attention will be given to this view below. Also in x956, the Assistant
Director of the Association in an article on sentencing in its official journal, took a
position different from either of these, proposing "a uniform provision under which
the courts would commit for the statutory maximum [a term prescribed in the
article as fifteen years, apparently without regard to the offense] without a mini.
mum."-" And in the same issue, the legal counsel of the Association expressed a
policy view differing from all the diverse ideas reflected in the Association, submitting
that there should be return to a system of definite sentencing.'2 He argued here, as
is done elsewhere in the literature, that imprisonment is shorter where definite sen-
tences are used and that legislation should focus primarily on the goal of reducing
the length of commitments.
The relationship of the length of imprisonment to the length of sentences is a
matter of great importance, of course, about which more should be known than can
be gleaned from a superficial inspection of the mass data collected by the various
jurisdictions. Unfortunately, too easy inferences have been drawn from the available
material, sometimes conclusions that are quite misleading' It may be useful to
scrutinize some of these data, with a view to more accurate appraisal of their
significance.
ONPPA, STANDARD PROBAIO AND PAROLE ACT § 12 (1955). Commentary on this section revealed
a widespread divergence of views among the committee members who participated as to whether there
should be a minimum term and whether the limits of the sentence should be fixed by the judge or by law.
"See ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE, MEmORANDUm FOR ADviSORY CoammaiE app. B, at 5-8 (9.57).
" Rector, Sentencing and Corrections, 2 N.P.P.A.J. 352, 357-58 (1956).
"
5Rubin, Long Prison Terms and the Form of Sentence, 2 id. at 337 (1956). Rector said: "I do not
agree with Mr. Rubin in his conclusion that the indeterminate form of sentencing is less compatible with
modern correctional philosophy than is the definite sentence and that it should be abolished. The
similarity in practice between the two forms shows clearly that the principle of the indeterminate
sentence is sound and that the solution to our difficulty is in further improving the use of the indeterminate
form of sentence by the courts and parole authorities rather than in abandoning it." Rector, supra note
is, at 355.
" ... . behind the relatively simple statistical data for each State, and among States, lies an intricate,
complex webbing of criminal codes, sentencing practices, and parole laws and policies, extremely difficult
to unravel." U.S. BUREAU OF PRIsoNs, DEP'T OF Jusnrc , PRIsONERS RELEASED FROM STATE AND FEDERAL
INsTITuTIONS, x951, at 8 (1955).
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In table two appear the figures most recently published by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons on what seems to be a reasonably representative variety of jurisdictions
employing definite sentences; indeterminate sentences in which the maximum term
is fixed by statute, including two jurisdictions where a paroling authority determines
the time of release and discharge; and indeterminate sentences in which the maxi-
mum term is fixed by the court. The table offers data on the lengths of prison terms
being served in i95o, including not only detailed figures on the seventeen jurisdic-
tions listed, but also summary figures for all definite and indeterminate sentences
being served that year. The table also provides general data on the length of im-
prisonment before the first release of offenders discharged in i95i and percentage
figures for the cases in which discharge was on parole. It is believed that a number
of propositions may be drawn from this material:
Definite sentences imposed by courts in the United States are of shorter duration,
of course, than the maximum limits of indeterminate sentences: only thirty-two per
cent of the definite sentences were in excess of five years, as compared to sixty-seven
per cent of indeterminate sentences. This contrast reflects the different policy base
of the definite-sentence system. Shorter average duration of imprisonment is also
characteristic under definite sentences, although the difference is not great: a median
of twenty months, as compared to a median of twenty-four months under in-
determinate sentences. The difference can be accounted for, in considerable part,
however, by the greater proportion of offenders in the indeterminate-sentence juris-
dictions who are retained in excess of five years, particularly in certain crucial juris-
dictions.
Closer analysis reveals that thirteen of the fifteen southern jurisdictions of the
United States use definite sentences primarily. Only five other, relatively non-
populous and noncriminal, jurisdictions are similarly committed to definite sentences.
Clearly, it is characteristic of the southern states to use low sentences and to imprison
offenders for relatively brief periods. That shorter incarceration should be attributed
to the employment of definite sentences itself, however, does not necessarily follow.
Undoubtedly, a factor of major importance is the relatively more limited use of
probation in the southern jurisdictions, so that "good cases" more commonly are im-
prisoned for short terms and are held only briefly. Furthermore, the data on certain
of these southern jurisdictions-e.g., Florida and Louisiana-reveal that where crime
is deemed a serious problem, the authorities are reluctant neither to employ high
terms in a considerable number of cases nor to retain such offenders for extended
periods in prison. It should be observed further that in several of the definite-
sentence jurisdictions, a relatively large proportion of minor offenders are held in
high-term penal institutions, their early release affecting the median imprisonment
data to some extent 14 Finally, it may be noted that those jurisdictions that use pri-
marily indeterminate sentences, in those cases in which they do employ definite
" The Federal Bureau of Prisons observes that this is particularly characteristic in Maryland, Dela-
ware, and Rhode Island. Id. at 7.
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TABLE II
SENTENCE LENGTHS AND TIME SERVED a
Sentence Lengths: Definite Sentences and Maximum Terms of Indefinite Time Served before First
Sentences, 1950 Release, 1951 Per-
-_-erntngo
Released
6 months Middle Per- on
to 2 2 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 99 Life Indef- Total Median 80 per centago Parolo
years years years years years inite (months) cent over 5(months) years
Definite Sentences
Montana ........ 192 144 51 18 3 1 409 12 8-30 1.0 49.5
Nebraslk ........ 184 148 48 13 7 3 403 18 0-30 2.7 18.1
Florida .......... 315 632 343 122 68 28 1515 23 10-54 7.5 30.7
Louisiana ........ 246 474 269 103 25 40 1157 17 6-61 10.5 62.4
Missour ........ 0 1163 258 80 24 18 1543 16 10-40 6.5 27.8
All definite





Nevada ......... 0 8 34 119 2 4 0 167 16 10-29 2.0 08.0
Iowa ............ 46 17 100 104 9 1 3 280 24 9-57 5.8 41.0
Kansas.......... 8 33 323 344 73 1 0 782 18 10-43 7.1 85.3
Indiana ......... 0 14 378 549 101 0 22 1064 24 12-57 9.0 80.3
Ohio ............ 3 287 364 674 1207 4 0 2539 24 18-57 8.7 93.2
Washingtoob ..... 0 1 20 582 305 11 8 025 17 8-2 13.7 100.





Minnesota ....... 28 80 324 148 76 5 0 881 25 13-47 5.7 74.3
Illinois .......... 107 622 519 347 71 24 5 1895 35 12-102 20.3 47.1
Pennsylvania .... 12 293 405 319 231 1 135 1398 31 184 21.7 80.1
New York ....... 6 770 1211 588 162 66 70 2873 31 15-88 17.0 75.7
New Jersey ...... 39 552 489 175 27 0 46 1328 20 10-57 8.7 78.9
All indeterminate
sentences ........ 1524 6214 7517 7496 2857 865 295 26768 21 18-90
All States ....... 21 9-01 10.1 65.9
-U. S. BunEAu or PranO,, DEP'T op JussEn, PasoSNERs IN STATE AhD FEDERAL INsTrrurioNs, 1050, tables 29 and 30 (1954); U.
S. BuqEAu or Paisoses, DcE'T OF JuaSCE, PRcSONERs RELEASEO Daon STATS AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, 1951, state t 8ble 1955).
bMaximum term fixed by statute; release and discharge dates by paroling agency.
sentences, impose similarly high terms on such prisoners. 5 Definite sentences and'
the retention of definite-sentence prisoners, accordingly, are not necessarily brief.
Indeterminate sentences are employed for the majority of prison commitments,.
it will have been noted in table one, in nearly all of the jurisdictions that are pro-
gressive in their correctional orientation-as well as in some that are not, of course.
It is striking to observe from the federal data that six jurisdictions-California,
Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania-are responsible for nearly
thirty per cent of all prison commitments in the United States and for nearly one-
half of all indeterminate sentences. These are all indeterminate-sentence jurisdic-
IsSee U.S. BremAu oF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PISONERS IN SrATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS,.
1950, table 29 (1954)-particularly the definite terms imposed in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Ohio, North Carolina, and West Virginia.
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tions; they are also populous and urban jurisdictions of the eastern and north-central
regions (except for California), where the volume of crime is large and where public
and official consciousness of the problem is acute. It is highly significant-although
scarcely surprising-that these jurisdictions, especially California, Illinois, New York,
and Pennsylvania, not only employ high sentences, but display the highest rates
of median prison retention and the highest proportions of offenders retained over
five years, as compared to the country as a whole. Obviously, they weigh very
heavily, indeed, in the over-all data on lengths of sentence and of incarceration.
The national picture of sentencing and imprisonment is highly colored, then, by
a dozen southern jurisdictions, where terms are low, on the one hand, and a half-
dozen northern and eastern jurisdictions, on the other hand, where sentences are
high, prison populations large, and a large proportion of offenders are retained for
extended periods. It should be observed, too, that the duration of imprisonment in
these latter jurisdictions is increased by two other factors that are in contrast with
the South: Probation takes the best cases in these jurisdictions, where probation
resources are relatively good, the more dangerous and recidivous offenders being im-
prisoned for high terms. Moreover, in several of these jurisdictions, many of the
less serious felons are incarcerated in county and local institutions, so that state prison
data indicate longer average and median retention than would be the case if all
felons were covered.10
We come now to a comparison between indeterminate-sentence jurisdictions
where the maximum terms are prescribed by statute and those where the maximum
terms are fixed by the courts. It appears, again, that facile inferences about the rela-
tionship between the length of imprisonment and maximum sentences are quite
inaccurate. Unfortunately, data for Michigan are not available, but for the other
jurisdictions that employ statutorily-prescribed maximum terms, the maximum
sentences are higher, as one should anticipate, than those where judges fix the
terms. The data for 1951 reveal, in fact, that where the maximum term was pre-
scribed by law, ninety-one per cent of the sentences were for five years or more and
sixty-six per cent for ten years or more. In those jurisdictions where the judges fixed
the maximum term, however, only sixty-seven per cent of the sentences were for
five years or more and forty-two per cent for ten years or more. Yet, it will be
observed in table two, comparing the two categories of jurisdictions, that where the
penal law prescribes the maximum terms, the median lengths of actual imprisonment
are lower and the percentages of offenders actually serving in excess of five years
are smaller than is true in the group of jurisdictions where the maximum terms are
fixed by the courts1 7 Neither the statutory determination of maximum terms nor
higher maximum terms themselves, therefore, necessarily result in a longer duration
a The Federal Bureau of Prisons notes that this is true especially in New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS RELEASED FROM STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS,
195i, at 7 (955).
1T The median period of imprisonment is over twenty-four months also in Massachusetts, North
Carolina, and 'Vest Virginia, other jurisdictions where the court fixes the maximum term.
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of imprisonment. This is not to deny, of course, that the jurisdictions which employ
statutory maximum terms differ from those where maximum terms are fixed by the
courts or from those where definite sentences are used. On the contrary, it should
be emphasized that length of imprisonment is related to local and regional character-
istics of crime and public opinion, rather than merely to the type of sentencing system
or to the length of terms imposed by the courts.
It should also be observed that in each of the jurisdictions, except Iowa and
California, where statutory maximum terms are employed, eighty per cent or more
of released offenders in 1951 were discharged by parole. 8 This may be compared
to 55.9 per cent of parole discharges for the country as a whole. Among definite-
sentence jurisdictions, only Arkansas exceeded this average, and only Louisiana and
Montana came close to it; half of the definite-sentence states discharged fewer than
thirty per cent of their prisoners on parole. This points up the fact that in these
jurisdictions, definite terms are still looked upon as the length of time that prisoners
are expected to serve, and offenders are released generally without the advantage
of planning, guidance, or control. In the indeterminate-sentence jurisdictions, on the
other hand, particularly in those where statutory maximum terms are employed,
parole is looked upon as a normal consequence of imprisonment.
III
The American Law Institute has given critical attention to the problems of
sentencing and treatment, seeking to arrive, in its Model Penal Code, at a policy
that might achieve the legitimate ends of correction with increasing effectiveness.
Among other issues, special consideration has been devoted to the problems raised
in this paper. The result has been the formulation of certain tentative policy
conclusions and draft provisions that are set forth summarily below. It is not
possible within the limitations of space available here fully to detail the reasoning
on which these have been based, but the following general proposals have been
made relative to prison terms and parole.19
A. Graded Felonies With Minimum and Maximum Terms
Felonies are graded into three categories according to their seriousness, with
sentences of indeterminate length for each category. The maximum terms for
ordinary offenders would be uniformly prescribed by statute, while the minimum
terms would be fixed by the court within a limited range established by law,20 as
indicated in table three.
That prison sentences should be indeterminate in length appears entirely justifiable
on the basis of experience and reason. How long the offender should be imprisoned
" U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, 1950,
chart 6 (1954), based on releases in 1951.
"For more extensive treatment, see especially MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.o, 6.o6 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1904); §§ 6.o9A, 305.10, 305.12, 305.13, 305.22, and commentary thereon (Tent. Draft. No. 5, 1956).
"I1d. § 6.05(2) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957) provides for a term without a minimum applicable at the
discretion of the court to young adult offenders.
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TABLE III
OwRiNARY TERms FOR FELONS
Minimum Maximum
Grade of Felony (fixed by court) (fixed by law)
first degree one to ten years life imprisonment
second degree one to three years ten years
third degree one to two years five years
cannot be precisely determined in advance, but should be related to his behavior and
attitude in the correctional situation. Furthermore, the range between minimum and
maximum terms should be sufficiently wide to adjust the treatment period to the
ostensible requirements of th,- individual and the community. The so-called definite-
sentence system, as noted above, could provide a range of term through establishing
the minimum term at some fraction of the sentence. But this is an artificial and
awkward, not to say mechanical, means by which to achieve indeterminacy. It
would, moreover, tie the duration of minimum and maximum terms rigidly to-
gether, so that no adjustment could be made in the former without alteration of the
latter. The only major argument, in fact, that has been adduced for this obsolescent
form of sentence is that definite terms result in shorter incarceration. As we have
seen, however, it is badly simplistic reasoning to infer that such a result proceeds
automatically from a system of definite sentencing as such. The spread between
minimum and maximum terms should be determined, instead, by considerations
appropriate to each, rather than by an inflexible formula that controls one through the
other.
The classification of felonies and graduated sanctions into three categories is
based upon the well-established principle that penalties should be gauged generally
to the extent of the offender's threat to the community, so as to permit a sufficient
length of treatment and custody. This gradation of indeterminate sentences is
believed to provide as discriminating a classification of the differences in the serious-
ness of crimes and in the requirements for long-term treatment as can be justified
at the time of sentencing. Such a set of categories would, moreover, provide a
simplicity of system that should contrast remarkably with the diversity of limits
that has developed ad hoc in our prevailing penal law. It would avoid the in-
vidious variations in terms that are imposed upon offenders of similar sort and
remove, thereby, a substantial basis for the sense of injustice that erodes the spirit
of many prisoners. The establishment of uniform maximum terms prescribed by
statute at each level would go further still to eliminate the chaos of disparate sen-
tences produced by the present law as it is administered by judges whose value
systems differ markedly. Courts would still, however, retain wide powers to de-
termine sentences by selecting between fine, probation, and imprisonment; by
reducing the grade of crime where appropriate; by choosing between ordinary
and extended terms; 21 and in fixing the minimum term.
-"The terms discussed in this paper are those applicable to the ordinary felon. The Code, however,
also provides for extended terms that may be imposed, in the discretion of the court, upon "persistent
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The power to fix maximum terms, while it may be cherished by some courts,
has proved too costly a restriction upon the legitimate province of correctional ad-
ministration. Along with the wide disparity in sentences it conduces, judicially-
determined maximum terms have afforded poor guidance to parole decisions-some
prisoners being held too briefly because the court-imposed maximum term either
required or appeared to suggest brief retention; others, too long because of the
persuasive power implicit in extreme terms that have been fixed by a judge. Hence,
it has been concluded that professionalized parole authorities should be entrusted with
the discretion to limit or extend imprisonment within the range of flexibility pro-
vided by reasonable maximum terms established in the law.
As to the duration of maximum terms, it is clear that, while these should be
sufficiently high to provide adequate social safeguard, they should not encourage
abusive prison retention and hopelessness among prisoners. A determination as to
the optimal length of prison terms is necessarily based, in part, upon arbitrary
judgments which, as present penal law makes obvious, vary greatly in different
times and places. The Code proposals do, however, reflect a careful appraisal of
present sentencing in the United States and of the periods of imprisonment that
eventuate under the sentences imposed. It is believed that the common use of life
imprisonment-terms, terms of twenty, twenty-five, and fifty years, and of very high
consecutive terms is unnecessary and undesirable, the more especially where non-
violent felonies are involved 2 They produce desperation in prisoners, without
sufficient compensating gains in deterrence, so far as one can discover. The Code
maximum terms for such felonies are lower than those prevailing in a number of the
jurisdictions that employ an indeterminate-sentence system; yet, they should afford
sufficient protection proportioned to the seriousness of the crimes involved. Fur-
thermore, the Code looks toward release to parole when it appears that the offender
may safely be discharged from prison. Thus, the thrust is toward early release of
offender[s]," "professional criminalrs]," "dangerous, mentally abnormal person[s]," and "multiple
offender[s]," as defined in id. § 7.03 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954), when it is believed that such terms are
necessary for the protection of the public. But the court must find specified circumstances to exist in
order to impose the extended terms. It appears that a wider judicial discretion is required in fixing the
length of such terms, and the judge is given authority to set both minimum and maximum terms within
these ranges:
Grade of Felony Minimum Maximum
first degree ten to twenty years life imprisonment
second degree one to five years ten to twenty years
third degree one to three years five to ten years
2
"Each of the six jurisdictions referred to in the text above provide by statute for maximum terms of
twenty years to life imprisonment for a large number of felonies. In Illinois, 126 crimes are pun-
ishable by terms of ten years or more, 34 by terms of twenty years or more. In California, the comparable
figures are 83 and 21. Maximum terms of ten years or more were imposed in 84.9 per cent of prison
sentences in California in 1950, 74.2 per cent in Ohio, 63.2 per cent in Indiana, 49.1 per cent in
Pennsylvania, 3o.8 per cent in New York, 26.4 per cent in Illinois, and 18.6 per cent in New Jersey.
Also, high consecutive terms are commonly assessed by the courts, a practice that would be carefully
controlled under id. § 7.o6.
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those who do not offer a substantial threat of violation.2 3  On the other hand, an
offender could be held for a long period, either when his crime was violent or when
his criminal history or personality appeared to justify the use of an extended term.24
Minimum terms under the Code would be fixed by the judge within statutory
ranges which, except for felonies of the first grade, are rather low. The matter
of minimum terms, their use and length, is controversial, owing, in part, to the clash
of positivistic theory, on the one hand, and demands of social defense, on the other.
In most jurisdictions, however, as has been seen, minimum terms have been deemed
a matter of practical expedience. Thus, even where they are not established by law,
they are commonly applied, in fact, by administrative practice. It is believed that
minimum terms should be employed for adult offenders in the interest of general
and individual prevention. They should be low enough to provide reformative
incentive, and in many cases, they need be no higher than is required for the prison's
program of classification, brief treatment, and parole preparation. This can be
accomplished in something less than a year ordinarily-a one-year minimum term,
less good-time earnings. In other cases, however, it is quite clear at the time of
sentence from the offender's record and character that a higher minimum term
should be fixed, both to assure a sufficient period of treatment and as a matter of
general deterrence. The court itself should have power to set much higher mini-
mum terms, for it is at the time of sentence that the gravity of the crime is publicly
assessed and prevention receives its proper emphasis. But for less serious offenses,
such minimum terms need not be high. It is only in the case of violent felonies,
therefore, that the Code provides a considerable latitude in the setting of the mini-
mum.
B. Separate Mandatory Parole Term
A "parole term," distinct from the term of imprisonment, is introduced as a
part of the sentence of the court, and parole planning and supervision is employed
23 Id. § 305.13 (Tent. Draft. No. 5, 1956) provides a series of criteria for determining date of
release on parole:
"(i) Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a prisoner who is eligible for release on
parole, it shall order his release, unless the Board is of the opinion that his release should be deferred
because:
(a) there is substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole; or
(b) his release at that time would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for
law; or
(c) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on prison discipline; or
(d) his continued correctional treatment, medical care or vocational or other training in the institution
will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date." The
section provides that the certain specified considerations and data should be taken into account in
arriving at the release decision.
At a number of other points in the Code, criteria have been formulated to guide decision--e.g., in
the sentencing provisions. See id. §§ 7.01-7,05 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957). On the value of articulating
criteria in the penal law, Professor Wechsler, Chief Reporter on the project, has said: ". . . the develop-
ment of statutory norms, mediating soundly between rule and discretion, represents one of the greatest
long-range needs of the entire field. The lack of such norms and of attention to the ways in which
they might be formulated may well be one of the important reasons why legislative participation in this
field, when it comes, so often is harsh and unsatisfactory."2 See note 21 supra.
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in all cases released from prison. These represent two significant departures in
sentencing and treatment practice. The Code will avoid the anomaly inherent in
present laws in which parole is carved out of the prison sentence, whereunder "good"
offenders are released early to face long supervision, "bad" ones retained throughout
most or all of their terms to be released with little or no supervision. Under the
Code proposal, when the parole authority released the prisoner for the first time,
this would terminate the prison term assessed by the court. Every offender would
then be submitted to an indefinite parole term, with a maximum duration of five
years, a term from which he could be discharged earlier by the board.25 Before such
discharge, however, he might be returned to prison to serve a portion of the parole
term if his parole was revoked for violation.
It is contemplated that most circumstantial and first offenders who displayed no
serious abnormality or aggression related to their crimes and who responded well
to treatment would be released early from prison and, under similarly favorable
circumstances, discharged early from parole. Dangerous and repetitive offenders
could be held long enough to assure community protection and would be subject to
control and reimprisonment if necessary, even after the specifically institutional
phase of the sentence had been terminated. In many jurisdictions, the effect of this
should be to abbreviate imprisonment of a considerable proportion of offenders, as
has previously been suggested, while a minority of more dangerous and recalcitrant
criminals would be subject to longer control than they are today in some-especially
southern and New England-jurisdictions.
It may be clear that the orientation of the Code, provisions for the handling
of release and parole differs from that of the traditional pattern under which many
prisoners are retained in prison by reason of the fear of parole boards that they
might violate parole. This anxiety is understandable under existing parole systems
that measure board achievement by violation rates. Boards assume no responsibility
for the consequence where offenders are discharged by operation of law without
supervision, whereas they are expected to make few "mistakes" in releasing indi-
viduals on parole who may offend while under supervision. Under the American
Law Institute plan, however, parole boards would face a different issue than they
do now: The question would be when rather than if the offender should be released
on parole. Over-all parole violation rates might very possibly be higher, since some
men would be paroled who today are discharged at the end of their terms without
supervision. Yet, if parole has any virtue as a form of correctional case work in
contributing to the conformity of released prisoners, fewer of these difficult offenders
would recidivate. It is surely the major objective of correction, parole included, to
reduce the total rates of recidivism rather than merely that of "good" cases. More-
25 MoDEaL PENAL CODE § 6.o9A (Tent. Draft. No. 5, 1956) provides that: "An offender sentenced
to an indefinite term of imprisonment in excess of one year ... shall be released conditionally on parole
at or before the expiration of his maximum sentence .... ." Relative to discharge from parole, id.
§ 305.15 provides: "A parolee is eligible for discharge from parole upon the satisfactory completion
of his minimum parole term less reductions for good behavior .. "
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over, the performance of the average offender should improve under a system in
which sound criteria guide the determination of parole release.
IV
In light of the diversity of law and practice that has been noted and the disparity
of views that have been expressed, the complexity of the issues that are involved in
sentencing and parole should readily be appreciated. While there is widespread dis-
satisfaction with prevaling legislation and administration, there is little inclination
among authorties either to agree on solutions or to look favorably upon innovations.
The Code proposals will be controversial, therefore, but it is hoped that they may
play some significant role in our common efforts to achieve the multiple ends of
correction more effectively. Critical evaluations of the Code drafts by interested
persons will be welcomed by the Code Reporters.
